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is small, for racial intermarriage is not widespread in any area of the
United States. Second, the number of such marriages will not great-
ly increase because of social and economic pressures. Writers sug-
gest that legislation has probably little or no effect on the rate of
racial intermarriage."' Thus, we are dealing with an idealistic or
theoretical right when compared with education or landholding. The
racial problems manifestly evident today concern areas more im-
portant to the country and to the negro, and at the same time, less im-
portant to the white than the instant problem. 47  In the last five
years considerable progress has been made, but it is suggested, that
for a court to minimize states' rights, to go against nearly 300 years
of policy, and to expand the Constitution on the basis of somewhat
tenuous reasoning, will result in great harm. As has been stressed,
the subject is of great importance to millions of persons. To bring
these deep rooted feelings to the fore could be disastrous. It would
not only give ammunition to the radical segregationists, but would
cause many persons, now gradually adjusting to integration in other
areas, to resist further attempts at racial equality.4  Even school
integration is not dead, for some persons contend,
the School Segregation cases [are] not the law of the land, but are
legally erroneous and ... the errors with which they abound should have
been detected and should now be corrected.49
Thus, in the absence of any dear basis to hold an anti-miscegena-
tion law unconstitutional, and Perez is certainly not dear, it would
be most improvident for the Supreme Court to grant certiorari at
this time. If certiorari be denied, there is no pronouncement to in-
flame passions on either side, and time may accomplish what no edict
can.
JOHN H. WILHARM, JR.
Patent Misuse Before and After Section 271
In order for a person to have the benefits of a monopoly, granted
by the patent laws of the United States, he must first have a patent.
The fact that a person does have a patent, however, does not confer
upon him carte blanche authority to use the benefits of the govern-
ment granted monopoly in any way he sees fit. An invention is in-
46. REUTER, RACE MIXTURE 103 (1931).
47. See note 16 supra, and accompanying text.
48. "One barrier to a closer drawing together of the white and negro races in America has
been the misconception on the part of many whites that the negro race desires amalgamation."
S. LOGAN, A NEGRO'S FAIr= IN AMERICA 27 (1946); "Most white Americans remain none-
theless opposed to intermarriage and many of them to the abolition of public segregation as a
possible first step toward it." R. LOGAN, WHAT THE NEGRO WANTS 28 (1944).
49. Bloch, The School Segregation Cases; A Legal Error That Should Be Corrected, 45
A.B.AJ. 27, 99 (1959).
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tellectual property and as such property it should be capable of own-
ership by its creator, just as a physical item which one may create.
Unfortunately such intangible subject matter would be incapable of
being locked away from unauthorized use were it not for the patent
laws. Our United States Patent Laws grant to the patent owner
the right to exclude others from the manufacture, use, or sale of the
invention defined in the claims of the patent. It is, therefore, a grant
of monopoly in the defined invention. In certain instances a person
may be guilty of patent misuse, and because of his conduct be de-
prived of the protection of the monopoly, which vested in him with
the issuance of the patent.
The area of patent misuse brings into sharp focus the clash of
two basic principles of American Jurisprudence. On one hand there
is the desire to protect the inventions of a person in order to promote
science. On the other hand, there is a strong policy in favor of free
competition and against monopolistic practices. The question thus
becomes, how far will the courts permit the extension of a lawful
monopoly?
EARLY CASE LAW CONCERNING CONTROL OF PATENTED ITEMS
At the turn of the century, the courts were allowing a wide lati-
tude in the permissive use of patented articles. In Heaton-Peninsu-
lar Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.' the court held valid
a license to use a patented machine only as long as unpatented fasten-
ers, which were used in the machine, were bought from the licensor.
The court went on to say that whoever sold fasteners to the licensee,
knowing that they were to be used in the machine in violation of the
agreement, was guilty of contributory infringement. "Contributory
infringement is intentional aid or cooperation in transactions, which
collectively constitute complete infringement."' As the name implies,
a contributory infringer is not guilty himself of infringement, but is
one whose actions culminate in an infringement by another person.
If a person sells a component part of a patented combination intend-
ing that such part be assembled and the combination sold, he is a con-
tributory infringer.3
The holding in the Heaton case was expressly approved and fol-
lowed by the Supreme Court in Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.4 The Court
held valid a licensing agreement between the owner of a patented ma-
chine and a licensee of the machine, providing that ink for the ma-
chine was to be bought exclusively from the licensor. The Court
further held that a person who sold ink to the licensee knowing that
1. 77 Fed. 288 (6th Cir. 1896).
2. 3 WALKER, PATENTS § 507 (1937).
3. Ibid.
4. 224 U.S. 1 (1912); cf. Leeds & Co. v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 213 U.S. 302 (1909)
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it was to be used in violation of the agreement was a contributory in-
fringer, and that also there must be an intent on the part of the seller
that the product sold be used in an infringing way. Anyone could make
and sell the ink, with one restriction - it could not be sold with the
intent that it be used in violation of the licensing agreement. The
doctrine of the Dick case, however, was short lived, for in 1917 the
Supreme Court, in Motion-Pictures Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co.,5 expressly overruled the Dick case and held that the owner
of a patented machine could not require the use of specific materials
in conjunction with, and necessary to the operation of the machine,
where such materials were not and could not be patented.
This view in the Motion-Pictures case became the accepted view
of the Court' and proved to be the starting point for an expansion
that, to all intents and purposes, completely eclipsed the doctrine of
contributory infringement.
THE DEMISE OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT AND THE
RISE OF MISUSE
One of the first cases in the gradual decline of the doctrine of
contributory infringement was Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co.7 The
Barber Company, which owned a process patent, sold to road builders
an unpatented staple article of commerce suitable to be used in the
patented process, with an implied license that the buyer could use the
patented process. In its petition the Barber Company alleged that
the Leitch Manufacturing Company sold the same article, knowing
that it was to be used for infringing the Barber Company's process
patent. The Court held that the Barber Company had no right to
limit the sale of a staple article of commerce, even though the seller
knew that it was to be used to infringe a process patent.
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Invest. Co.' involved a licensing
agreement between the owner of a combination patent and the manu-
facturers of switches used in the patent. The owner of the patent
did not manufacture the combination, but licensed other companies
to make switches and use them to produce the patented combination.
Royalties were based on the sale of the combinations. The Court
found that the switches did not have any substantial non-infringing
use.' However, the Court held that the owner of a patent on a com-
bination device cannot use the patent to control the sale of unpatented
parts of the combination, even though the parts have no substantial
5. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
6. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Develop. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
7. 302 U.S. 458 (1938); see also Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942).
8. 320 U.S. 661 (1944); also companion case, Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-H Reg. Co.,
320 U.S. 681 (1944).
9. 320 U.S. 661, 664 (1944).
1959]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
use other than as parts of the patented device. The Court further
held that equity will deny relief to one who so uses his monopoly,
even though the defendant is guilty of contributory infringement. Al-
though this holding was a great expansion of the doctrine of patent
misuse, the dictum of Mr. Justice Douglas in the decision was equally
significant.
The result of this decision, together with those which have preceded it,
is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory -infringement.
What residuum may be left we need not stop to consider.10
Because of this dictum, some courts subsequently held that the doc-
trine of contributory infringement had been abolished by the Mercoid
case.
11
THE RESTORATION OF CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
Because judicial interpretation was eliminating or had eliminated
the last vestiges of the doctrine of contributory infringement, the
Patent Act of 195212 included Section 271,13 which was a move to
restore this doctrine within proper limitations.
(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable
as an infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufactured
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in prac-
ticing a patented process constituting a material part of the invention,
knowing the same to 'be especially made or especially adapted for use in
an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantive non-infringing use, shall be liable as
a contributory infringer.' 4
Subsections (b) and (c) represent a clear attempt to codify and
restore contributory infringement. However, in view of the Mercoid
case, perhaps even these subsections would not be enough. Implic-
itly, by this decision, recovery will be barred by misuse even though
contributory infringement is shown. Therefore, certain acts were
specifically designated as not being misuse of a patent.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of a patent right by reason of his
having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from
acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute
contributory infringement of the patent; (2) license or authorize another
to perform acts which -if performed without his consent would constitute
10. Id. at 669.
11. Stokes & Smith Co. v. Transparent Wrap Mach. Corp., 156 F.2d 198 (2d Cit. 1946);
Landis Mach. Co. v. Chaso Tool Co., 141 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1944).
12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952).
13. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1952).
14. Ibid.
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contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his
patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement.' 5
The purpose of Section 271 (d) (3) was to remove any doubt
that the mere bringing of a suit for patent infringement amounts to
patent misuse. It has been suggested that the Mercoid case could be
construed to have espoused that doctrine,16 but this point is defini-
tively decided by this section.
TYPES OF SITUATIONS GIvING RISE TO CLAIMS OF MISUSE
There are basically three situations that raise the question of
patent misuse.
1) The patent covers a given apparatus but not the material
used by the apparatus, and the material so used is suitable
for non-infringing use.
2) The patent covers a combination or process, but the individ-
ual components of the combination or materials used in the
process are not patented and such materials are suitable for
non-infringing use.'"
3) The patent covers a combination or process and the individ-
ual components of the combination or materials used in the
process are not patented but the individual components or
materials are not suitable for substantial non-infringing
use.
1 9
Section 271 (e) expressly defines a contributory infringer as one who
sells a component of a patented combination process which com-
ponent is not a staple suitable for substantial non-infringing use.
Since both situation (1) and (2) above concern staples suitable for
non-infringing use, these two classes are not covered by the definition
of a contributory infringer. The owner of a patent could not main-
tain a suit against one who is selling the article as a contributory in-
fringer. The clear implication of this section is that under no cir-
cumstances could a person be liable as an infringer if he furnished a
staple for use in a patented device, provided that the patent did not
cover the staple in combination (Situation 1). But Section 271 (b)
might cover Situation 2 in some instances, and a person might be
liable, not as a contributory infringer, but as an infringer. The mere
selling of a staple, that is suitable for non-infringing use probably
would not be considered an infringement, but it has been suggested
15. Ibid.
16. Stroco Products, Inc. v. Mullenbach, 67 U.S.P.Q. 168 (S.D. Cal. 1944); see Wood, The
Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, 13 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 61, 73, (1944).
17. Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), is an illustration of this situation.
18. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), is an illustration of this situation.
19. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), is an illustration of
this situation.
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that the sale of a staple with directions for an infringing use and ad-
vertisement for that use could be considered as actively inducing in-
fringement, thereby rendering such person liable as a direct in-
fringer.2 0 The major change envisioned by Section 271, however, is
directed toward the third situation.
Section 271 (c) defines contributory infringement, and Section
271 (d) abolishes the defense of misuse under certain circumstances.
Section 271 (d) seems to be directed squarely at the Mercoid hold-
ing, although it has been suggested that the language of none of these
subsections exactly covers the Mercoid situation.2  It is submitted,
however, that Section 271 (c) and 271 (d) taken together meet the
Mercoid situation and have effectively changed that decision. In
that case the defendant was selling a component of a patented device,
and the Court held that it was not a staple of commerce suitable for
substantial non-infringing use. Under Section 271 (c) the defendant
would clearly be liable as a contributory infringer. The fact that the
plaintiff licensed another to sell components, and derived revenue
therefrom, does not, under Section 271 (d), make the plaintiff guilty
of patent misuse, nor under this same section does the bringing of a
suit make the plaintiff guilty of misuse. The wording of Section 271
was carefully chosen to preserve the doctrine of contributory in-
fringement in appropriate cases, such as the Mercoid case, and to
leave undisturbed the doctrine of patent misuse as a defense to con-
tributory infringement where that doctrine has applied historically.
DECISIONS UNDER SECTION 271
In Hall Laboratories v. Spring Cotton Mills, 22 the plaintiff
owned a process patent. Plaintiff sold a chemical for use in that
process, which chemical had other non-infringing uses. A 2-cent license
fee per pound of chemical sold for use in the process was charged.
If the chemical was bought for use other than in the process, no fee
was charged. If persons bought the chemical from some other source
for use in the process, the plaintiff required that 2 cents per pound be
paid to it as royalties for using the process. The court held that this
did not constitute patent misuse, and the plaintiff was not barred
from enforcing its patent. However, in Dr. Salisbury's Laboratories
v. J. D. Russell Co. Laboratories" the court held that the sale of a
staple article of commerce, which was suitable for substantial non-
infringing use, was specifically covered in Section 271 and did not
constitute contributory infringement. The court said that it was not
20. Note, Contributory Infringement and Misuse -The Effect of Section 271 of the Patent
Act of 1952, 66 HARv. L. REv. 909, 917 (1953).
21. Id. at 916.
22. 112 F. Supp. 29 (W.D.S.C. 1953).
23. 212 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1954).
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deciding whether or not Section 271 had changed the law. It was
merely giving import to the section and applying the classic definition
of contributory infringement as codified and determined, and this was
not contributory infringement.24
One of the first cases to give insight as to the direction the courts
would take was Southern States Equip. Corp. v. U. S. C. 0. Power
Equip. Corp.25 Strangely enough, the court did not even discuss
patent misuse, but the facts were nearly identical with those of the
Mercoid case. One defendant company sold castings to another de-
fendant company with which it was closely allied. These castings
had no substantial non-infringing use (with one minor exception
which was not considered material and was treated as if it did not
exist). The opinion of the court did not even cite the Mercoid case,
but said that under Section 271 the company was clearly a contribu-
tory infringer and that the plaintiff patent owner was entitled to
relief. Because of the close relationship of one defendant company
to the other, the court held the contributory infringer was chargeable
with knowledge as a matter of law. Although the court did not dis-
cuss the Mercoid case, the implication of its decision appears to be
that the court considered the Mercoid case changed by the statute.
This case presented a perfect fact situation for a discussion of the
questions of patent misuse and whether or not the Mercoid case was
still controlling, but this discussion was not forthcoming.
The first court to face squarely the problem of whether or not
Section 271 has changed the rule of the Mercoid case was a district
court, deciding Sola Electric Co. v. General Electric Co."" The
plaintiff owned a patent on a system having some unpatented com-
ponents. The plaintiff did not sell the whole system, but did sell un-
patented ballasts which were part of the system and, with the sale of
these ballasts, granted an implied license to use the system. The court
found that these ballasts did not have any substantial non-infringing
use. These facts fit the Mercoid situation precisely and the court
recognized this. The court held that under the doctrine of the Mer-
coid case the plaintiffs were guilty of patent misuse and under the
old law would not have been able to recover, but that this doctrine
had been changed by Section 271. Acts such as this, which would
have been misuse under the doctrine of the Mercoid case, were now
lawful.
The court has considered the statute in question (Section 271), the
cases and articles relating to it, and the arguments of counsel, and cannot
24. Ibid. However, the court says "W~e believe that, whatever changes may or may not
have been made in other respects, there has been no abrogation of the principle announced in
the Carbice and Mercoid cases." Id. at 416. This dictum is misleading in as much as the court
expressly rests its decision on the clause of section 271 excluding staple articles of commerce
not suitable for substantial non-infringing use.
25. 209 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1953).
26. 146 F. Sapp. 625 (N.D. I 1956).
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escape the conviction that it was the purpose of Congress to change the
law announced in the two Mercoid cases ... and that it did change the
law as announced in those cases27
This is a clear and dispositive holding that the law has been changed.
There seems to be no question that the mere bringing of a suit is
not to be considered patent misuse. 8 This is clear from the language
of the section and this is true notwithstanding the language in the
Mercoid case."9
CASES NOT CLEARLY WITHIN THE MERCOID DOCTRINE
Since the enactment of Section 271, the courts have not been in-
clined to apply the Mercoid doctrine to related areas. In the Sterns"°
case the court refused to extend the doctrine to cover the lease of a
patented combination. The court held that the combining of a
patented article with a non-patented article and the sale or lease of
the combination does not, in and of itself, constitute misuse. How-
ever, the refusal to sell the unpatented part of the device without
selling the patented part can constitute misuse. This, of course, is
one of the abuses of the patent monopoly which the doctrine of mis-
use is intended to prevent.
Another interesting case is Electric-Pipe Line v. Fluid System."'
The owner of a patented combination installed the combination and
guaranteed its operation. As a part of the agreement the owner of
the patent required that all repair parts be bought from the patent
owner who installed the combination. The court held that this situ-
ation was not covered by the decision in the Mercoid case since that
case dealt with unassembled parts. The court reasoned that since
the owner of the patent installed the system and guaranteed it, it was
not unreasonable to require that the repair parts be bought from the
person who installed the system. In this case the court said that it
did not consider whether Section 271 had changed the law with re-
spect to the Mercoid case since this situation was not covered by the
doctrine announced in that case.
Another case, United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,3 2 raised
the interesting problem of the meaning of the phrase "otherwise en-
titled to relief.""8  The defendant in a prior case3 4 had been found
guilty of patent misuse in violation of the anti-trust laws. In this
27. Id. at 647.
28. Sterns v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1958); Martin v. Alexander Corp.,
160 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
29. Sterns v. Tinker & Rasor, 252 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1958).
30. Ibid.
31. 231 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1956).
32. 134 F. Supp. 69 (D.D.C. 1955).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1952).
34. United States v. United States Gypsum Company, 124 F. Supp. 573 (D.D.C. 1954).
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